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A. Introduction
The law is a living organism, which is reflected by the ever--evolving landscape of international criminal law. Time and again, conflicts demonstrate the many ways in which human beings can hurt each other. The law must be able to anticipate and react to these cruelties. On the one hand, the law must be specific enough to assure legal certainty and prevent arbitrary convictions; on the other hand, it must be broad and general enough to keep up with developments in real life and cover previously unimagined behavior. Forced marriage is an example of such a criminal phenomenon, which, even though the taking of brides by the victor has for centuries been a common occurrence during conflict situations, has only recently appeared in the international limelight. 1 When the international community is confronted with criminal practices that are not codified in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, it is faced with the daunting task of legally characterizing this conduct: can the act in question be brought within the ambit of the core crimes of the Rome Statute? And if so, how is it best criminalized: as a war crime, a form of genocide, or a crime against humanity? Over the past few years, several authors have made an effort to formulate a doctrinal basis for the international criminalization process and these theories will be discussed in section B. Next, the taxonomy of international criminalization and the structure of crimes against humanity will be highlighted (section C). After the required knowledge about international criminalization has been acquired, a road map pertaining to the criminalization of acts as crimes against humanity is presented in section D. For this purpose, the taxonomy of Article 7 of the Rome Statute, the provision in which crimes against humanity are defined, is analyzed. Subsequently, the requirements that an act must fulfill in order to amount to an inhumane act will be discussed, with a special focus on the scope of the category of 'other inhumane acts'.
B. Doctrinal Foundations of International Criminalization I. The Advancement of the Core Crimes: A Short Overview
International criminalization of individual conduct is a recent phenomenon that only really started evolving from the 1990s onwards. 4 Before the establishment of the ad hoc
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), international law had a mainly repressive function in criminal matters: criminal aspects of international law aimed at allowing states to better regulate the joint repression of certain (mainly transnational) offences, such as human trafficking and counterfeiting. These so--called treaty--crimes, which are part of the field of law known as international criminal law in the broad sense, do not create direct individual criminal responsibility under international law.
5
The first real developments with regard to international criminal law in the strict sense-that is the substantive law concerning the crimes for which international 3 This article focuses on crimes against humanity only. The classification of conduct as a war crime, form of genocide or aggression falls outside of the scope of this article. 4 See ROBERT CRYER, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES: SELECTIVITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW REGIME 9--72 (2005). International Criminal Court was held in Rome. The Rome Statute, which was negotiated during this Conference, gives the International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.
12
During the Rome Conference there was a relatively large amount of (indirect) input from (international) criminal law experts-which is rather exceptional seeing as in the process of drawing up a treaty, the participation of lawyers is usually more the exception than the rule.
13
Delegates at Rome, many of whom were not experts in (international) criminal law, were able to draw upon the work done by committees such as the ILC, the 1995 Ad Hoc Committee and the 1996 Preparatory Committee. These committees had done preparatory work and had prepared the consolidated text of the Draft Rome Statute.
14
The experienced former members of these committees also coordinated most of the working groups during the negotiations in Rome. Nevertheless, the delegates had to opt for consensus, presumably at the cost of a consistent legal method, which, in view of the difficulties of reconciling different legal systems, seems to have been the only option for the creation of a widely accepted statute. 15 As the above demonstrates, the evolutionary process of international criminalization lacks any form of systematization or method and is best characterized as a series of ad hoc responses to specific events. 16 Created and amended in reaction to atrocities committed during various conflicts and continuously put to the test by man's ingenuity when it comes to inflicting harms upon others, the special part of international criminal law has traditionally not been founded on elaborate, crystallized theories. There exists no coherent, generally agreed--upon set of principles that may be used to justify criminalization: international crimes are in part based on 'intuitive--moralistic' and legal-- 12 The ICC will have jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once the States Parties have activated the jurisdiction, which will happen after January 1, 2017, see Resolution 6 of the Review Conference, supra note 2. 13 The legislative process on the international level differs greatly from that on the national level. The adoption of legislation by a state is usually preceded by a lengthy procedure of preparatory work by legislative experts, input from Bar Associations, professional groups and non--legal consultants, debates in the Upper and Lower Houses of Parliament, resulting in revisions which are then followed by more debates. In contrast, generally only few experts are involved in the process of drawing up a treaty. On the international level diplomats are the ones that conduct treaty negotiations and these diplomats are not necessarily experts in the subject at hand. See MAHMOUD CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. VOLUME 1:  INTRODUCTION,  ANALYSIS  AND  INTEGRATED TEXT 91 (2005). 14 Id. at 66--67, 72.
15 Id. at 92. 16 As stated, the Genocide Convention-even the term 'genocide' itself (see RAPHAËL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE: LAWS OF OCCUPATION, ANALYSIS OF GOVERNMENT, PROPOSALS FOR REDRESS, 79 (1944))-was a direct result of the atrocities committed during World War II, which also influenced the content of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Vietnam War, in turn, influenced additional Protocol I (see Cryer, supra note 5, at 119--120; and BASSIOUNI, supra note 7, at 253. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l political considerations.
17
But seeing as international criminal law is a developing field of law and since it is not inconceivable that in the future more offences will be brought within the jurisdiction of the ICC, 18 the added value of uncovering the doctrinal foundations of the international criminalization process is self--evident.
19
Several authors have made an effort to reveal such a doctrinal basis. Three of these theories are discussed in the following paragraph.
20
The scholars referred to below focus on international criminal law in the broad sense (i.e. not just the core crimes, but also transnational and treaty--crimes for which international law does not impose individual criminal liability), with the exception of May, who discusses the criminalization of crimes against humanity in particular. 21 II. An Inductive, a Descriptive and a Normative Approach: Bassiouni, Cassese and May Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni was one of the first scholars who set forth a doctrinal basis for the international criminalization policy, basing his theory on an empirical study he conducted.
22
Analyzing all relevant sources of international law, Bassiouni selected all conventions that in one way or another penalize or oblige States to penalize certain behavior. This exercise resulted in a grand total of 267 conventions. Going through these conventions, he identified a total number of twenty--eight international crimes. 21 These theories concern the international criminalisation of crimes sui generis or categories of crimes, such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, but also slavery and piracy. The theories therefore do not concern the labelling of specific acts (such as murder or rape) as crimes against humanity (with the exception of May's normative theory). 22 Cryer, supra note 5, at 133. 23 For an overview see Cryer, supra note 5, at 134--135. These are international crimes in the broad sense, i.e. 253 (1999) . G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l universal interest in repressing these crimes, which, in principle, results in universal jurisdiction; 26 and finally (4) the perpetrators of international crimes do not enjoy functional immunity, which means that de facto or de iure state officials can be held accountable for committing international crimes. 27 A different approach to the international criminalization process is taken by Larry May. Whereas Cassese and Bassiouni give a descriptive answer to the question 'what are international crimes?', summing up the criteria that are used in the process of identifying them, May approaches international criminalization and especially the legitimacy of international prosecutions for crimes against humanity from a predominantly normative point of view. May stresses the importance of uncovering the theoretical foundations of international criminalization, so that a clear basis for identifying international crimes can be developed.
28
He contends that three basic moral principles legitimize criminalization in general, that is on both the national as well as the international level: the principles of legality, harm 29 and proportionality.
30
If a criminal rule does not adhere to these three basic notions, it is not morally legitimate and its enforcement cannot be justified. 31 However, May argues that international criminalization and prosecutions require further moral justifications. In his view, these justifications are provided by two additional normative principles of international criminal law: the security principle and the international harm principle. The security principle makes prosecution before international criminal courts and tribunals possible: when a state deprives its own citizens of physical security or subsistence, or when it fails to protect its citizens from violations of physical security or subsistence, a state loses its claim to sovereignty and the international community can intervene in the state's internal affairs.
32
This intervention can take the form of prosecution of that state's subjects before international criminal bodies: by harming or not protecting its people from harm, a state has also lost its right to exclusive 26 Id. at 11. 27 Cassese points out that some senior state officials, such as heads of state, may nevertheless enjoy personal immunity while they are in office. See id. at 12. However, in a recent decision of ICC Pre--Trial Chamber I in the case against the President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir, the Pre--Trial Chamber ruled that personal immunity of former or sitting heads of state cannot be invoked to oppose a prosecution by an international court. See The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, 2009 ICC--02/05--01/09, Decision pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the failure by the Republic of Malawi to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 12, 2011) at para. 36. 28 MAY, supra note 19, at 21, 64--68. 29 It is legitimate to criminalise an act when it causes (at least a certain amount of) harm-defined as a 'setback of interests'-and when criminalisation is aimed at the prevention of this harm. See id., at 66. 30 The principle of proportionality requires that the punishment fits the crime. See id. at 67. 31 Id. at 65--67. 32 Id. at 68--69.
adjudication. 33 However, the security principle alone is not enough to justify international criminalization and prosecution. 34 The required additional justification is found in what May calls the international harm principle. To put it briefly, this principle implies that crimes which are group--based-because they are either perpetrated by a group (which includes state involvement) or victimize a group-violate a strong interest of the international community and in some cases even humanity as a whole. And because this group--based harm damages humanity, the conduct is raised to the status of an international crime. 35 The group--based nature of the victim-that is when crimes harm a large group of victims-makes a crime widespread. The group--based nature of the perpetrator, on the other hand, makes a crime systematic.
36
In this way, the international harm principle recognizes that international crimes (and crimes against humanity in particular) are those crimes that are either widespread or systematic and so egregious that they harm humanity.
37
Summarizing May's argument: international criminalization and prosecution are legitimate when the conduct in question violated a security interest of the victim and somehow harms an interest of the world community. 38 The three theories described form a doctrinal basis for the international criminalization process. They advance criteria that may be used to justify the creation of crimes under international (criminal) law. Although the approaches taken by the authors differ, the outcomes of their studies are similar: there are certain universal values that the international community holds in such high regard that violation of these values warrant international criminalization. Crimes against humanity were criminalized because they constitute a threat to international peace and security and because they shock the conscience of mankind-they therefore rise to the level required by Bassiouni's first and second criterion applicable to the policy of international criminalization.
39
Crimes against humanity shock the conscience of mankind because they are contrary to universal norms. The notion of 'shocking the conscience of mankind', therefore, is linked to the universality of certain values. 40 May's normative approach also clearly reflects this value--based 33 Id. at 72, 75, 80. 34 Id. at 70. 35 Id. at 80--95. 36 Id. at 81--82, 84--90. 37 Id. at 80, 82.
38 Id. at 107. (2010); Gaeta, supra note 5 at 66; Cryer, supra note 5, at 133, 138. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l justification for international criminalization: when an act violates a strong interest of the international community or humanity as a whole and thereby harms humanity, the conduct is raised to the status of an international crime. 41 Cassese includes in his characterization of international crimes violations of international customary rules that protect values that are considered binding and important by the whole international community.
42
All three theories thus put emphasis on the violation of universal values. The concept of universal values has had to endure a fair amount of opposition. Some have argued, for example, that international criminal law is a Western edifice that is imposed on other societies. 43 The fact, however, that every state in the world has ratified the Geneva Conventions 44 provides evidence to the contrary and so does the repeated and unanimous condemnation of genocide, war crimes, aggression and crimes against humanity by the UN General Assembly. 45 As was pointed out by Leila Sadat, Chinese, Islamic as well as Hindu traditions "underscore the universal values enshrined in the prohibition of (...) crimes that shock the conscience of mankind." 46 And it is, in the words of Paola Gaeta, "on account of the values they protect that these crimes (i.e. the core crimes; IH) are truly international; it is because of the importance of these values that the international community directly criminalizes them". had agreed that the prospective international criminal court ought to deal only with crimes that are of the most serious concern to the international community as a whole. 49 As remarked by a European candidate, the ICC was not created 'as a panacea for all ills '. 50 This notion of subsidiarity is reflected by the preamble of the Rome Statute, and more specifically with regard to crimes against humanity by the ICC Elements of Crimes (EoC) in the introductory provision to this core crime:
Since article 7 pertains to international criminal law, its provisions, consistent with article 22, must be strictly construed, taking into account that crimes against humanity as defined in article 7 are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole . G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l Acts that already had been recognized as crimes against humanity in the statutes of other international criminal courts and tribunals, such as the IMT, ICTY and ICTR, were included in the Rome Statute because these particular offences were considered to reflect customary international law. When it came to including 'new' acts as crimes against humanity, i.e. acts which were not included in previous major instruments pertaining to international criminal law, such as the enforced disappearance of persons, the drafters of the Rome Statute considered it important to avoid as much overlap as possible between different inhumane acts, so as to maintain clarity and prevent superfluous crimes. 52 This is evidenced, inter alia, by the negations on the inclusion of sexual slavery, both as a war crime and as a crime against humanity. From the outset, the codification of sexual slavery in the Rome Statute enjoyed much support among delegates. Nevertheless, in Rome, during the negotiations concerning this crime, two important issues arose: questions concerning what the differences are between sexual slavery and the broader crime of enslavement on the one hand, and what the differences are between sexual slavery and enforced prostitution on the other hand. Some delegates were concerned that sexual slavery, being a form of enslavement, was completely subsumed under this latter crime and would therefore become superfluous, especially seeing as the sexual elements of sexual slavery could be addressed by charging rape cumulatively with enslavement. However, after several discussions, delegates agreed that rape and enslavement-the two crimes that were traditionally used to prosecute instances of sexual slavery 53 -did not cover the spectrum of harms caused by sexual slavery, and therefore it was decided to list both enslavement and sexual slavery as distinct crimes against humanity. 54 As regards the second issue, some delegates were concerned about the overlap between sexual slavery and enforced prostitution. The leading question during the debates on this issue was whether sexual slavery should replace the crime of enforced prostitution. Supporters of this proposal concluded that sexual slavery encompasses enforced prostitution and better reflects the reality of the crime. Opponents, i.e. those who remonstrated that both crimes deserved to be included in the Rome Statute, argued on the other hand that enforced prostitution has its own unique elements, especially when committed in peacetime, which make it distinct from sexual slavery. [hereinafter Kunarac Trial Judgement]. In this precedent--setting case, the ICTY considered the crime of enslavement for sexual purposes (NB: enslavement was included in the ICTY Statute; sexual slavery was not). 54 Oosterveld, supra note 49, at 625. 55 Oosterveld, supra note 49, at 620--621.
on this matter remained (and arguably still is) divided and because it was not clear whether scenarios were possible in which an act of enforced prostitution would not also constitute sexual slavery, it was decided to include both crimes in the corpus of positive international criminal law. 56 The importance of the distinctiveness of crimes was not only discussed with regards to sexual slavery. As a result of the guiding principle that overlap should be avoided, a proposal to include a crime of mass starvation in the list of crimes against humanity did not receive sufficient support because delegates opined that this conduct would most likely fall under the existing crimes of murder and extermination. 57 
II. The Structure of Crimes Against Humanity
Crimes against humanity are codified in Article 7 of the Rome Statute. The first paragraph of this provision contains a list of inhumane acts preceded by a chapeau, which sets out the conditions under which the commission of these acts amounts to a crime against humanity:
1 ., 1999) . G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l (f) Torture; (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; (i) Enforced disappearance of persons; (j) The crime of apartheid; (k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health. The category of acts that constitute crimes against humanity set out in Article 7(1) of the Rome Statute is not exhaustive: any act which is inhumane in nature and character may amount to a crime against humanity (an 'other inhumane act'), provided the chapeau elements are met.
58

D. A Road Map for the Criminalization of Acts as Crimes Against Humanity I. Introduction: Options for Criminalization
The theories on international criminalization advanced by Bassiouni, Cassese and May demonstrate that only the most serious crimes warrant international criminalization. This coincides with the intent of the drafters of the Rome Statute and is also affirmed by the text of this Statute and its EoC. More specifically, it is reflected by the definition of crimes against humanity: crimes against humanity are among the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. Pursuant to Article 7 of the Rome Statute the condicio sine qua non for penalizing conduct as a crime against humanity is that the [is] taken in establishing a list of all the various forms of infliction, one would never be able to catch up with the imagination of future torturers who wished to satisfy their bestial instincts; and the more specific and complete a list tries to be, the more restrictive it becomes." conduct amounts to an inhumane act. 59 When an act cannot be qualified as 'inhumane' it will not amount to a crime against humanity, meaning the conduct cannot be criminalized as such. There are two ways in which certain conduct can constitute a crime against humanity. First, it is possible that the conduct in question is in fact already penalized as a crime against humanity, because it is subsumed under the inhumane acts enumerated in Article 7 of the Rome Statute. This was the case for the forced marriages that took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo: in the decision on the confirmation of the charges in the case against Katanga and Ngudjolo Chui, the ICC Pre--Trial Chamber stated that forced marriage is a form of sexual slavery that is completely subsumed under the latter offence and can therefore not be qualified as a distinct crime under the heading 'other inhumane acts'. 60 The same goes for the forced marriages that took place during the civil war in Sierra Leone: in the recently issued judgment in the case against Charles Taylor, the Trial Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) considered that forced marriage is not a new crime, not a distinct inhumane act, but that it is in fact subsumed under the crime of sexual slavery. 61 Another example of an act that is considered to be subsumed under an enumerated inhumane act is the crime of mass starvation: as was mentioned above, during the negotiations in Rome on the Statute of the ICC, delegates considered that this conduct would most likely be covered by the crimes of murder and extermination. 62 Second, it is possible that particular conduct is not covered by already enumerated inhumane acts, but nevertheless amounts to an inhumane act and is therefore criminalized through the catch--all clause 'other inhumane acts' codified in Article 7(1)(k). This was the case for example with forced nudity: the ICTR Trial Chamber in the Akayesu judgment found that forced nudity, which is not listed as an inhumane act in the ICTR Statute as such, can amount to an 'other inhumane act'. 63 forced disappearance and forced prostitution as 'other inhumane acts'. These crimes were not included as G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l with regard to the Charles Taylor trial judgment, in its earlier case law, the SCSL has held that the forced marriages which took place during the civil war in Sierra Leone should be qualified as 'other inhumane acts', because they are distinct from enumerated acts such as sexual slavery.
64
Therefore, when the conduct in question contains at least one distinct element which is not included in the definition of existing inhumane acts, those acts will not adequately cover the distinguishing characteristics of this conduct and consequently will not completely subsume that act. If this is the case, then the question should be asked whether or not the particular conduct could be qualified as an 'other inhumane act'. When the crime does not amount to an 'other inhumane act', either because it cannot be classified as 'inhumane' or because it did not cause serious suffering or injury, 65 it will fall outside the ambit of crimes against humanity and can therefore not be criminalized as such. This paragraph analyses each of these possibilities of criminalizing conduct as a crime against humanity.
II. The Conduct is Subsumed Under Enumerated Specific Inhumane Acts
From a practical point of view, the most logical step is to first verify whether the conduct in question is perhaps already subsumed under existing inhumane acts. If perpetrators of particular conduct can be adequately prosecuted using existing law, creating a new crime would be redundant. 66 The negotiations on the inclusion of certain acts, such as sexual slavery and enforced disappearance of persons, as distinct crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute clearly demonstrate that while overlap between crimes is allowed, least one element that is not included in already enumerated crimes. 68 In other words, the act should require proof of a fact that is not required by other crimes. 69 The requirement that a new crime contains at least one unique element that is not encompassed in existing crimes is also mentioned in literature with regard to international criminal law in the broad sense. Ben Saul argues, for example, that the fact that existing international or transnational crimes already prohibit the same conduct under a different nomenclature constitutes a pragmatic, but compelling objection to separately criminalize that conduct. 70 When, on the other hand, the conduct in question has unique and distinguishing characteristics which are not adequately reflected in existing criminal prohibitions, this constitutes an indication that it may be warranted to specifically criminalize this conduct. 71 More generally, restricting the proliferation of superfluous or duplicate international criminal offences will contribute to the overall systematic integrity and coherence of international criminal law.
72 A similar type of reasoning is reflected by the umbrella category of 'other inhumane acts' (discussed in detail below). This catch--all clause was included in the provision of crimes against humanity (for the first time in the London Charter of the IMT) to prevent inhumane acts that are not explicitly enumerated as crimes against humanity from falling outside the scope of international criminal law. Herzegovina, however, argued that a specific criminalisation of this offence was needed because it has a different criminal purpose (i.e. making and keeping a woman pregnant, for example to change the ethnic composition of a population) than other forms of sexual assaults. See Discussion Paper: Delegation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (crime of enforced pregnancy), Rome Conference Preparatory Works, 15 April 1998, available at: http://www.legal--tools.org/en/go--to--database/ltfolder/0_15715/#results (last accessed: 27 June 2013). It should be noted that the main reason the Holy See had for arguing that forced pregnancy should not be included, was that it (along with a few Catholic and Arab countries) was concerned that a crime of forced pregnancy might oblige national systems to allow women who were forcibly impregnated to abort the fetus, and would in that way in fact create a right to abortion. See Hebel & Robinson, supra note 57, at 100; and Cate Steains, Gender issues, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT. THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 357, 366--367 (Roy Lee ed., 1999). (hereinafter "Čelebići Appeal Judgement"). 70 Saul, supra note 17, at 245. 71 With regard to criminalising terrorism in international law, see id. at 247 (2008). 72 Id. at 210. 73 The ICTY Trial Chamber declared that the charge of 'other inhumane acts' is generic and encompasses a series of criminal activities that are not explicitly enumerated. See Blaškič Trial Judgement, supra note 58, at para. 237. G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l inhumane act', the conduct must not already be covered by one of the crimes specified as crimes against humanity in a particular statute. 74 This conclusion is confirmed by the case law of the ICTY and ICTR and also follows from logical grammatical interpretation: the clause deals with other inhumane acts. 75 The uniqueness or distinctiveness of a crime-and the concern for the proliferation of offences and the creation of duplicitous crimes-also has procedural importance, which may be demonstrated by turning to the practice of cumulative convictions, which is accepted before international criminal bodies.
76
In accordance with the case law of the ICTY, cumulative convictions of two or more offences for the same conduct are only allowed in so far as each distinct crime contains at least one materially distinct element not included in the other crimes. If this is not the case, cumulative convictions are impermissible and instead, the more specific provision will have primacy over the less specific offence in accordance with the lex specialis--rule.
77
The ICC's position with regard to cumulative convictions is still unclear.
78
The ICC has, however, already spoken out on the phenomenon of cumulative charging. Whereas other international criminal tribunals and courts, such as the ad hoc Tribunals, the SCSL and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), permit the prosecutorial practice of cumulative charging, even when one charge is fully subsumed in another charge, the position of the ICC Pre--Trial Chamber appears to be different, or at least less definite. 79 At the pre--trial stage, the ICTY allows the prosecutor to cumulatively charge offences for the same conduct, since at an early stage of the trial, it is difficult for prosecutors to know precisely which charges will ultimately be proven. See Čelebići Appeal Judgement, supra note, at para. 400; Saul, supra note 17, at 249. However, in earlier case law, the ICTY Trial Chamber judged otherwise: "the Prosecutor may be justified in bringing cumulative charges when the Articles of the Statute referred to are designed to protect different values and when each confirmation of the charges in the case against Jean--Pierre Bemba Gombo, Pre--Trial Chamber II applied the test for cumulative convictions, which was formulated by the ICTY in the Čelebići case, to the charging stage, considering that "only distinct crimes may justify a cumulative charging approach and, ultimately, be confirmed as charges." 80 In other words, the Pre--Trial Chamber ruled that the prosecution can only bring multiple charges for the same conduct if each of these crimes requires at least one additional material element which is not required by the other. 81 Notably, approximately three months before Pre--Trial Chamber II issued this decision, Pre--Trial Chamber I permitted the practice of cumulative charging in the arrest warrant against Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir. 82 This suggests that the issue of cumulative charging is not yet settled in the context of the ICC. As was stated above, for behavior to be classified as a crime against humanity, it must amount to an inhumane act. Several of these inhumane acts are already specifically enumerated in Article 7 of the Rome Statute. The drafters of the Rome Statute, as well as legal doctrine and criminal procedure, greatly value the substantive distinctiveness of a crime. When certain conduct is not materially distinct from an enumerated inhumane act, this forms a compelling pragmatic argument not to reshape this particular conduct into a new crime, under a new label. Therefore, when evaluating whether certain conduct could be criminalized as a crime against humanity, the first question that must be addressed is whether the act has at least one materially distinct element not included in existing crimes. This can be done by verifying whether the conduct is already subsumed under existing inhumane acts. When evaluating whether certain conduct falls within the ambit of the crimes listed in Article 7 of the Rome Statute, it is important to give heed to the lex stricta norm enshrined in Article 22 of the Rome Statute that provisions must be strictly construed. 83 If the conclusion is that the conduct has distinguishing characteristics which are not adequately reflected in the existing legal criminal instruments, the next step is answering the question of whether that particular conduct can nevertheless be classified as 'inhumane'. This question can be answered by assessing whether this conduct can be qualified as an 'other inhumane act'.
III. The Conduct Constitutes an 'other inhumane act' 1. The Definition of 'other inhumane acts'
The requirements an act must satisfy in order to be qualified as 'inhumane' follow from the umbrella clause 'other inhumane acts'. As stated, this particular provision was included in the provision of crimes against humanity to prevent inhumane acts that are not explicitly enumerated as crimes against humanity from falling outside the scope of international criminal law.
84
In this sense, the clause allows courts flexibility in determining the cases before them, which prevents the crimes against humanity provision from becoming too rigid.
85
The catch--all clause 'other inhumane acts', which is part of customary international law, is included in the provisions of crimes against humanity of the London Charter, the Tokyo Charter, and in the Statutes of the ICTY, ICTR, SCSL and ECCC. 86 In none of these documents, however, was the clause was defined, rendering it imprecise and unspecified. 1)(k) . G e r m a n L a w J o u r n a l humanity provision caused great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health on the part of the victim-are tightly interwoven. They are discussed below with a specific focus on the requirement that an act is inhumane.
Great Suffering, or Serious Injury to Body or to Mental or Physical Health
The definition of 'other inhumane acts' requires that an act caused a certain amount of suffering on the part of the victim, more specifically, it requires 'great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health'. It is complicated to set a specific baseline for determining the level of suffering or pain that must have been caused. The ad hoc Tribunals draw parallels between the terminology used in the crime against humanity of 'other inhumane acts', and the war crimes of cruel treatment and inhuman treatment, considering that the severity of the conduct is the same for all three crimes: serious mental or physical sufferings or injury or a serious attack on human dignity. 92 The EoC of the Rome Statute, however, require different standards for these crimes: the threshold of suffering for the war crimes of inhuman treatment and cruel treatment are put on par with that required for torture: 'severe physical or mental pain or suffering'; whereas 'other inhumane acts' were given a slightly lower threshold, requiring great suffering.
93
The commission of a serious attack on human dignity is not expressly included in the definition of 'other inhumane acts' under the Rome Statute. The suffering element of 'other inhumane acts' can be informed by the interpretation of the war crime of willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health under Article 8(2)(a)(iii) of the Rome Statute, which arises from the grave breach provisions of the Geneva Conventions. 94 This offence has been defined in the case law of the ICTY as an act that causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury.
95
In line with the case law of the ICTR, the ICTY has held that "serious harm need not cause permanent and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. It must be harm that results in a grave and long--term disadvantage to a person's ability to lead a normal and constructive life." Trial Chamber held that human rights law forms the standard by which the inhumanity of an act can be judged. Referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Inter--American Convention on Human Rights, and the Convention against Torture, the Trial Chamber argued that the provisions of the most important international human rights instruments may be used "to identify a set of basic rights appertaining to human beings, the infringement of which may amount, depending on the accompanying circumstances, to a crime against humanity." 104 In a judgment published three years after the Kupreškić et al. judgment, Trial Chamber II of the ICTY greatly nuanced the unbridled use of human rights to identify parameters for the interpretation of 'other inhumane acts'. In its judgment in the Stakić case, Trial Chamber II explicitly stated that it disagreed with the approach taken by the Trial Chamber in Kupreškić et al. and called to mind the report of the Secretary--General which states that the legality principle requires the ICTY to "apply rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond doubt part of customary law". Since human rights do not necessarily amount to norms of international criminal law, the Chamber did not want to use human rights instruments automatically as a basis for such legal criminal norms. 105 In principle, the ICC can use human rights law as a source for determining the scope of the clause 'other inhumane acts'. This claim is substantiated by four arguments. Firstly, the material jurisdiction of the ICC is not limited to the rules of international humanitarian law. Pursuant to Article 21 of the Rome Statute, the Court's first source of law is the Rome Statute together with the EoC and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The second source of law consists of applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of conflict. Thirdly, the Court can apply general principles of law that it derives from national laws and legal systems of the world. In accordance with the third paragraph of this Article, the Court must apply and interpret the law in a way that is consistent with internationally recognized human rights. Secondly, "crimes against humanity are to a great extent predicated upon international human rights law," and therefore it can be argued that the violation of human rights may be indicative of the seriousness and moral wrongness of certain conduct. 106 Thirdly, the view that human rights law can be used for determining what acts constitute inhumane rights law can assist in this exercise, especially those human rights norms that prohibit inhumane treatment.
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E. Conclusion
This article analyzed the ways in which an act can be classified as a crime against humanity. Crimes against humanity concern specific acts that are committed as part of an attack against a civilian population. As the terminology suggests, an act may be qualified as a crime against humanity when it constitutes an inhumane act, either because it is subsumed under enumerated acts (such as murder, torture, rape or extermination), or because it amounts to an 'other inhumane act'. When certain conduct does not have characteristics that materially distinguish it from enumerated inhumane acts, meaning it does not require proof of a fact that is not required by other crimes, this conduct can be said to be subsumed under one or more of those acts, and can consequently be charged as such. Contrary to what was stated in earlier judgments in other cases before the SCSL, in the 2012 judgment in the case against Charles Taylor the Trial Chamber-in the absence of any specific charge relating to forced marriage-held that forced marriage is not a distinct inhumane act, but is covered by the elements of enslavement and sexual slavery. However, when conduct is not covered by any of the listed specific inhumane acts, so when it has definitional characteristics that are not covered by the elements of enumerated crimes against humanity, the clause 'other inhumane acts' comes into view. This catch--all provision has endured some criticism over the past few years, especially with regard to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. The crime is defined in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and its concomitant Elements of Crimes. Even though the elements of the crime have now been delineated, its exact scope is not yet clear: the documents defining 'other inhumane acts' do not offer guidelines which help in identifying possible inhumane acts. The only yardstick that is provided is the eiusdem generis rule of interpretation, which requires that the act in question is of a comparable gravity to the listed crimes against humanity. Human rights law can be used in determining the inhumanity of an act, but some caution is required: crimes against humanity deal with the most serious criminal offences of concern to the world community as a whole and create direct individual criminal responsibility. The acts currently enumerated in Article 7 of the Rome Statute concern the right to life, bodily integrity and liberty. Not every violation of every human right will therefore amount to an inhumane act; only when it is of gravity 
